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CURING THE FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY MUDDLE 
THROUGH A BREYER-BASED BLEND UP? TOWARD A LESS 
CATEGORICAL, MORE VALUES-ORIENTED APPROACH FOR 




This Article argues that the United States Supreme Court should 
significantly alter its current categorical approach for discerning standards 
of judicial review in free-speech cases.  The present system should become 
nondeterminative and be augmented with a modified version of Justice 
Stephen Breyer’s long-preferred proportionality framework.  Specifically, 
the Article’s proposed tack fuses facets of today’s policy, which largely 
pivots on distinguishing content-based laws from content-neutral laws and 
letting that categorization determine scrutiny, with a more nuanced, values-
and-interests methodology.  A values-and-interests formula would allow the 
Court to climb up or down the traditional ladder of scrutiny rungs – strict, 
intermediate or rational basis – depending on whether a statute jeopardizes 
a core rationale for safeguarding free expression and the degree to which 
that rationale is threatened.  Given the frequent divide along partisan lines 
on today’s Supreme Court over scrutiny in First Amendment speech cases, 
a two-tiered approach that blends aspects of a categorical strategy with a 
values-and-interests tack provides a path forward as the Court moves fully 
into the third decade of the twenty-first century. 
  
 
*   Professor of Law, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the 
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Justice Elena Kagan, writing in 2018 on behalf of the United States 
Supreme Court’s four liberal-leaning members in dissent in Janus v. 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, chided 
the five-justice conservative majority for “weaponizing the First 
Amendment.”1  Elaborating on this accusation, she criticized the majority 
for “turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against 
workaday economic and regulatory policy.”2  What partly piqued Kagan’s 
ire in Janus was the majority’s decision to deploy a heightened level of 
scrutiny, rather than a variation of the deferential rational basis standard of 
review, to analyze and strike down a state statute affecting funding for 
public-sector labor unions during collective bargaining for violating the 
First Amendment.3  As Professor Erica Goldberg encapsulated it, Kagan 
“accused . . . the majority of demeaning the majesty of the First Amendment 
in order to use it to suit their own political preferences – in this case, 
defunding public sector unions.”4   
The day before ruling in Janus, the same five-to-four composition of 
justices fractured over the use of heightened scrutiny by the majority in 
 
1.   138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  See id. at 2487 (noting that Kagan 
was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor).  The First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Free Speech and Free 
Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause as fundamental liberties applicable for governing the actions of state and local government 
entities and officials.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (finding “that freedom of 
speech and of the press – which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress – 
are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
2.   Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
3.   There are three traditional tiers of judicial review in U.S. constitutional law – strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review – with rational basis being the most deferential 
test and the one that applies when “a law . . . only minimally burdens constitutional rights (the vast bulk 
of all laws) . . . .” Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment Implications of 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government, 66 MO. L. REV. 141, 158 (2001). Writing for the majority in 
Janus, Justice Samuel Alito Jr. concluded that the dissent’s call for using a version of “rational-basis 
review” amounted to a “form of minimal scrutiny [that] is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and 
we reject it here.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. See Clay Calvert, Is Everything a Full-Blown First 
Amendment Case After Becerra and Janus? Sorting Out Standards of Scrutiny and Untangling “Speech 
as Speech” Cases from Disputes Incidentally Affecting Expression, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 73, 125–28 
(addressing the majority’s decision to use heightened scrutiny in Janus). 



















National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.5 The majority 
opinion, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, held that a California statute 
that compelled licensed crisis pregnancy centers—facilities commonly 
operated by pro-life, anti-abortion religious groups—to notify women on 
their premises that the state provides free and low-cost abortions was subject 
to heightened review because it was a content based statute.6 The majority, 
in turn, concluded that the organizations challenging the law were likely to 
succeed on their First Amendment-based speech claim against California.7 
Writing in dissent on behalf of the Court’s liberal wing in Becerra, 
Justice Stephen Breyer attacked the majority’s conclusion that heightened 
scrutiny was presumptively warranted simply because the statute was 
content based.8  He contended that “[b]ecause much, perhaps most, human 
behavior takes place through speech and because much, perhaps most, law 
regulates that speech in terms of its content, the majority’s approach at the 
least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of 
much, perhaps most, government regulation.”9 By “suggesting that 
heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation”10 
merely because laws regulating it are content based, the majority—as 
Breyer averred—does “a serious disservice through dilution”11 to traditional 
rationales for protecting speech, including facilitating truth seeking in the 
marketplace of ideas and shielding from censorship unpopular ideas.12 
In her Janus dissent, Justice Kagan also intimated that deploying 
heightened scrutiny degrades another core First Amendment value—
namely, protecting democratic self-governance.13 Ultimately, the majority’s 
approach to scrutiny in Becerra and Janus readily taps into what Professor 
Tabatha Abu El-Haj calls the Roberts Court’s “increasing suspicions of 
 
5.   138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
6.   Id. at 2371. The majority ultimately concluded the law could not “survive even 
intermediate scrutiny,” much less strict scrutiny. Id. at 2375. 
7.   Id. at 2376. 
8.   Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
9.   Id.  
10.   Id. at 2382. 
11.   Id. at 2383. 
12.  Id. at 2382–83.  
13.  See Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (concluding that “almost all economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech. So 
the majority’s road runs long. And at every stop are black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices. The 
First Amendment was meant for better things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic 
governance . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

















content-based speech regulation.”14  
Indeed, the macro-level fear here is that applying heightened scrutiny 
solely because a law is categorized as a content based regulation, rather than 
using heightened scrutiny because a law threatens traditional First 
Amendment values,15 facilitates the First Amendment’s deployment as a 
wrecking ball against a wide range of economic and social legislation that 
otherwise would face only rational basis review.16  This tack signals, as 
Breyer suggested in Becerra, a return to the Lochner era, with the First 
Amendment now being used for goring social, economic and welfare 
legislation.17  In brief, selecting heightened scrutiny simply because a law 
is categorized as content based greases the skids for “the process of 
deregulation by First Amendment.”18 
This Article addresses the growing friction over how standards of 
judicial scrutiny should be selected in First Amendment cases.  Part I 
reviews the Court’s current categorical methodology for free-speech 
jurisprudence generally and, more specifically, as it affects scrutiny by 
categorizing laws as either content based or content neutral.19  Part II then 
explores Justice Breyer’s alternative approach to scrutiny, which considers 
categories such as content based and content neutral merely as rules of 
thumb and that, instead, leans more heavily on whether core First 
 
14.   Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 917, 917 (2017). 
15.  For example, truth seeking and democratic self-governance are traditional First 
Amendment values that Breyer dubbed in Becerra as “the true value[s] of protecting freedom of 
speech.” Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2383 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
16.   See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 (2016) (observing that rational basis is used “to analyze government 
economic regulations and social welfare legislation when there is no discrimination based on a suspect 
classification or infringement of a fundamental right”). 
17.   Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Historically, the Court has been wary 
of claims that regulation of business activity, particularly health-related activity, violates the 
Constitution.  Ever since this Court departed from the approach it set forth in Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), ordinary economic and social legislation has been thought to raise little constitutional 
concern.” (citations omitted)).  In Lochner, the Court concluded that an individual’s liberty and freedom 
of contract took priority over the government’s police power to enforce, in the interest of public health, 
a labor law limiting the number of hours per week that bakers could work.  During the so-called Lochner 
era, the Court declared invalid many laws “for infringing freedom of contract.” Chemerinsky, supra note 
16, at 408. 
18.   Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 323, 331 (2016). 


















Amendment ideals are imperiled.20  Finally, Part III advocates for replacing 
today’s categorical framework for scrutiny with a modified version of 
Breyer’s approach that blends consideration of current categories with a 
values-based balancing methodology.21 
 
I. LIVING IN A CATEGORICAL WORLD:  
LEVELS OF PIGEONHOLING IN FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE AND THEIR IMPACT ON SCRUTINY  
 
First Amendment free-expression jurisprudence is systemically 
categorical. It is a framework that, on first glance, appears to foster 
predictability and consistency by warding off dangers of an ad hoc 
balancing methodology that inefficiently weighs anew, with each case, 
speech interests against the harms that such expression might cause.22 
Today’s categorical approach to free-speech disputes is multi-tiered, 
featuring at least four levels of categorization.23 
At the threshold level, the issue is whether the underlying matter 
spawning a lawsuit should be categorized as speech or conduct.24  Matters 
falling into the latter grouping generally reside outside the scope of First 
Amendment protection.25 “Generally” is purposefully deployed above 
 
20.   Infra notes 56–77 and accompanying text. 
21.   Infra notes 78–86 and accompanying text. 
22.   See Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech – And the Protracted 
Failure to Delimit the True Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2016) 
(noting that “[o]n its face, a categorical structure establishes a consistent rule-based methodology that 
constrains courts, promoting – if not ensuring – disciplined predictability in free speech jurisprudence,” 
and adding that “it allows for a default rule that – consistent with the unequivocal language of the First 
Amendment itself – affords virtually absolute protection against content based suppression . . . .”); see 
also Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
671, 673 (1983) (“An ad hoc approach weighs, in each particular case, the interests served by the speech 
against the asserted state interest in prohibition or regulation.”). 
23.   Cf. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment 
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 386 –87 (2009) (identifying three levels of categorical analysis in First 
Amendment law). 
24.   See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (noting 
that “[w]hile drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have 
long drawn it.”). 
25.   See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that “a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression . . . 
is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.”); see also R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint 
Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52 IND. L. REV. 355, 356 (2019) (noting that “[g]overnmental 
 

















because a second tier of categorization is whether conduct may be classified 
as symbolic expression, thereby triggering possible First Amendment 
protection.26  Examples of symbolic speech range from burning the flag of 
the United States of America in political protest to dancing naked in a 
sexually oriented business as a form of sexual expression.27  This caveat of 
symbolic expression to the speech-conduct dichotomy ultimately is just one 
of multiple exceptions to the categorical rules that animate First 
Amendment law and that, in turn, muddle what at first seemingly are crisp, 
clear-cut distinctions.28  In brief, these carveouts shatter the illusion of 
clarity that a categorical framework for judicial analysis appears to hold. 
The categorizing, however, does not stop with the first two levels.  A 
third stage arises once a court determines that either “pure speech” or 
symbolic expression is in play.29  The issue here is whether the speech falls 
into a category of expression that the Supreme Court has deemed generally 
outside the wall of First Amendment coverage. As Justice Anthony 
Kennedy wrote in 2002, “[t]he freedom of speech has its limits; it does not 
embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, 
obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.”30 The Court 
began identifying such categorical carveouts from First Amendment 
 
regulations of conduct . . . are outside of the ambit of the First Amendment”); Amanda Shanor, First 
Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 319 (2018) (“The animating premise of much First 
Amendment theory and case law is that some things are speech, which fall within the First Amendment’s 
ambit, and others are conduct, and so fall outside it.”). 
26.   See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The First Amendment affords 
protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”); see also Diahann DaSilva, 
Playing a “Labeling Game”: Classifying Expression as Conduct as a Means of Circumventing First 
Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. REV. 767, 773 (2015) (“Conduct receives First Amendment protection 
when it is intended to convey a message and that message is likely to be understood.”). 
27.   See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (concluding that Gregory Lee Johnson’s 
burning of the flag of the United States of America outside of the 1984 Republican National Convention 
“implicate[d] the First Amendment”); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (1991) (observing, in the context of a 
lawsuit involving two businesses that wanted to provide totally nude dancing to patrons as a form of 
entertainment, that “nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within 
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”). 
28.   See infra notes 35–36 and 41 and accompanying text (addressing exceptions to other 
categorical rules in First Amendment law). 
29.   Cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (describing a federal statute that barred 
the disclosure of information obtained from an illegally intercepted telephone call as “a regulation of 
pure speech”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (describing 
the wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War as being “closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, 
we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment”). 


















protection nearly eighty years ago in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, opining 
that “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem.”31  The Chaplinsky Court excluded categories 
of speech from First Amendment shelter based upon their lack of value 
when weighed against society’s interests in order and morality.32 
Chaplinsky, in short, “modeled the categorical approach to setting the First 
Amendment’s boundaries.”33   
Here too there are caveats that cloud the “categorical exclusion 
doctrine,”34 such as the fact that while it is illegal to distribute obscene 
speech, one can freely possess it at home.35  Similarly, while fighting words 
constitute a generally unprotected category of expression, the government 
cannot go inside that free-speech exception and selectively restrict fighting 
words regarding only some topics, but not others, “based on hostility—or 
favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”36 
If, however, the speech at issue is not pigeonholed into one of these 
unprotected categories—if, in contrast, it is presumptively safeguarded by 
 
31.   Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).  See Burton Caine, The 
Trouble With “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values 
and Should be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 443 (2004) (observing that in Chaplinsky the Court 
decided “to carve out, in wholesale fashion, vast categories of exceptions to the First Amendment’s 
otherwise unqualified protection of speech”). 
32.   Justice Frank Murphy wrote for the Court that categories of speech such as obscenity and 
fighting words could be jettisoned from the First Amendment’s penthouse of protection because they 
serve “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  This is known as the low-value theory of free expression.  See 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194 
(1983) (noting that “[t]he ‘low’ value theory first appeared in the famous dictum of Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire”).   
33.   Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First 
Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2015). 
34.   Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 
44 SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 407 (2014). 
35.   Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold that obscenity is not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”), with Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
565 (1969) (“Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think 
they reach into the privacy of one’s own home.”). 
36.   R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). In this instance, the Court held 
unconstitutional a St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance that applied “only to ‘fighting words’ that insult, or 
provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’  Displays containing abusive 
invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the 
specified disfavored topics.”  Id. at 391. 

















the First Amendment—then a fourth categorization phase comes into play 
when lawmakers nonetheless attempt to regulate it. This fourth tier of 
categorization is the one at the heart of this Article, and it directly affects 
how rigorously or deferentially a court examines a statute restricting 
protected speech. It pivots on classifying a statute as content neutral, content 
based, or viewpoint based.37 
Laws falling into the content neutral category are subject to the 
heightened yet generally deferential intermediate scrutiny standard,38 while 
content based measures must surmount the more rigorous and demanding 
strict scrutiny test.39  Viewpoint-based laws—a subset of content based ones 
that involve government discrimination against some viewpoints, but not 
others, on a particular subject or topic—are considered especially 
reprehensible to the First Amendment and are always unconstitutional.40 
 
37.   See Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget 
Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 131 (2008) (“In its jurisprudence, the Court has 
recognized three categories of regulations on expression: content neutral, content based, and viewpoint 
based.  Whether a regulation will be upheld depends in large measure on the Court’s initial determination 
of the category to which it belongs.”). 
38.   Id. at 131–32. Intermediate scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate that it has a 
significant interest justifying a law and that the law’s terms are narrowly drawn.  Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).  Under intermediate scrutiny, however, a law “need not be the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means of” serving the government’s interest in order for it to be 
narrowly drawn.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). As the Court has noted, 
“[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s 
interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the 
government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.” Id. at 800.  
Additionally, when intermediate scrutiny is applied in the context of content-neutral time, place and 
manner regulations, the test requires the regulation in question to “leave open ample alternative channels 
for communication of the information” rather than completely banning the speech. Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). This is sometimes known as the “alternative-
channels-of-communication prong” of intermediate scrutiny. Clay Calvert & Minch Minchin, Can the 
Undue-Burden Standard Add Clarity and Rigor to Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence? A Proposal Cutting Across Constitutional Domains for Time, Place & Manner 
Regulations, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 630 (2017). In practice, intermediate scrutiny in free-speech cases 
often amounts to “a highly deferential form of review which virtually all laws pass.” Leslie Kendrick, 
Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2012).   
39.   Strict scrutiny is “a demanding standard” that requires the government to prove that a law 
“is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.” Brown 
v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011). Narrowly drawn, in contrast to its meaning for the 
intermediate scrutiny test noted immediately above, means that a law “must be the least restrictive means 
of achieving a compelling state interest.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).  Strict scrutiny 
“nearly always proves fatal” for the laws that are subjected to it.  Kendrick, supra note 38, at 237.  
40.   See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (asserting that “what we have termed 



















Exceptions from the categorical approach at this fourth level exist that once 
again muddy the seeming clarity. For example, statutes regulating 
advertising content—commercial speech, in First Amendment 
nomenclature—are reviewed under a version of intermediate scrutiny rather 
than, as one might expect for a content-based regulation, strict scrutiny.41  
Nonetheless, there is a “nearly categorical application of strict scrutiny 
in cases involving content-based speech restrictions.”42 The Supreme Court 
added teeth to this inelastic categorical principle in the 2015 case of Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert.43 Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas 
observed that a law is content based if it “applies to particular speech 
because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed”44 thereby 
“draw[ing] distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.”45 Thomas 
wrote that laws that are content based on their face are subject to “strict 
scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral 
justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated 
speech.”46 In other words, a noble legislative purpose will not spare a law 
from the arduous strict scrutiny test. Additionally, even facially neutral laws 
are categorized as content based and must surmount strict scrutiny if they 
were adopted because lawmakers disagreed with the underlying message 
conveyed.47 In short, a law that by its terms seemingly applies equally—i.e., 
 
515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995)); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“When the government targets not subject 
matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all 
the more blatant. . . . Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”); 
see also Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly 
Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 76–77 (1997) (“Viewpoint regulations go beyond 
regulating speech on a particular topic or subject matter.  They regulate one side of a debate or topic but 
not the other. In brief, one viewpoint on a particular issue is treated more favorably under a law . . . than 
another on the same issue.”). 
41.   See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (noting that “we engage in 
‘intermediate’ scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech,” and explaining that the Court has “always 
been careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment’s core”); see also 
Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Pandora’s Box of 21st Century Commercial Speech Doctrine: Sorrell, R.A.V., 
and Purpose-Constrained Scrutiny, 19 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 19, 31 (2014) (noting that the 
Supreme “Court has chosen to apply intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech regulation rather than 
a stricter or more lenient standard of review”). 
42.   David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 398 
(2015). 
43.   576 U.S. 155 (2015). 
44.   Id. at 163. 
45.    Id.  
46.   Id. at 165. 
47.   Id. at 164. 

















neutrally – to all topics and subjects, but which was, in fact, adopted for a 
content based “purpose and justification,” faces strict scrutiny review.48 
The ramifications of this categorical approach to scrutiny are enormous. 
As Professors Dan Kozlowski and Derigan Silver note, “it is much easier 
for a law to pass intermediate scrutiny than strict scrutiny, making the 
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws important.”49  
First Amendment scholar David Hudson agrees, writing that “[t]he 
distinction is often outcome determinative in free-speech cases, as most 
content-based laws are struck down and most content-neutral laws are 
upheld.”50 To paraphrase Justice Kagan’s concerns from Janus, strict 
scrutiny is a powerful First Amendment weapon in the judiciary’s arsenal 
for attacking and destroying the handiwork of lawmakers.51 
Applying strict scrutiny to content-based laws is a blunt, short-cut 
methodology for resolving First Amendment battles.  That is because, as 
Professor Han remarks, it eliminates the need for judges and justices “to 
meaningfully articulate and wrestle with their foundational intuitions 
regarding the value of the right at stake and the relevant regulatory interests 
in order to reach the preordained outcome.”52  That preordained outcome is 
a law being struck down, as “strict scrutiny leaves few survivors.”53 
  
 
48.   Id. at 166. 
49.   Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination 
in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 191, 196 
(2019). 
50.   David L. Hudson, Jr., The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 259, 261 (2019). 
51.   Janus v. Am. Federation of State, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting); 
supra note 1 accompanying text. 
52.   Han, supra note 42, at 399. 


















More problematically, the logic that strict scrutiny must be used because 
a law is content-based means that strict scrutiny applies even when the 
content being regulated is of exceedingly low value and a more deferential 
standard of review might be more appropriate.  As Professor Han explains, 
although certain categories of speech have been excluded from all First 
Amendment coverage because of their low value,54  
there remains a strong intuition that not all remaining 
speech ought to be valued equally, and that applying the 
strict scrutiny default rule is too severe in particular cases.  
In other words, in some subset of cases, the default rule of 
strict scrutiny does not fit, in that its application does not 
match our fundamental intuitions regarding the value of 
speech and the social harms associated with the speech.55 
In brief, applying strict scrutiny when core First Amendment values are 
not threatened by a statute that regulates low-value speech is judicial 
overkill. However, Justice Breyer’s approach for determining scrutiny 
directly injects a healthy dose of First Amendment values into the equation 
to counteract this malady. 
  
 
54.   See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Stone, supra note 32 and 
accompanying text (addressing Chaplinsky’s low-value theory of expression to eliminate certain 
varieties of speech from any First Amendment protection). 
55.   Han, supra note 42, at 400–01. 

















II. THE BREYER APPROACH:  
DEVOLVING RIGID CATEGORIES INTO RULES OF THUMB, 
LETTING FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES TAKE CENTER STAGE 
 
When it comes to scrutiny in First Amendment cases, Justice Stephen 
Breyer is the Court’s categorical contrarian.  He even questions the merits 
of the threshold inquiry addressed earlier of categorizing the underlying 
artifact in a case as speech or conduct.56  Breyer explained in 2017 that 
“because virtually all government regulation affects speech,” it often is 
better for the Court “not to try to distinguish between ‘speech’ and 
‘conduct’” when the government regulates activities in which humans relate 
via speech.57 The implication here is that just because speech may be 
affected by a law does not turn a case challenging it into an all-out First 
Amendment battle over freedom of speech, writ large, necessitating 
heightened scrutiny standards.  Justice Kagan seemingly endorsed Breyer’s 
desire to collapse the speech-versus-conduct dichotomy in Janus, observing 
that “[s]peech is everywhere – part of every human activity (employment, 
health care, securities trading, you name it). For that reason, almost all 
economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech.”58  To the extent 
that initially categorizing a law as affecting speech, rather than as regulating 
conduct, triggers the need to apply a heightened tier of First Amendment 
review (either intermediate or strict scrutiny), rather than a lower level of 
analysis (rational basis),59 then the first-level phase of categorization should 
be jettisoned.60  Speech and conduct are simply too inextricably intertwined 
 
56.  See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018); Barnes 
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); supra notes 24–
25 accompanying text (describing this first-level phase of categorization). 
57.   Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). Justice Breyer reinforced his stance regarding the intertwined—rather than separable and 
dichotomized—nature of speech and conduct the next year in Becerra, observing there that “much, 
perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech.” Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
58.   Janus v. Am. Fed. State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
59.   See Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-
McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 495 (2012) (“The lowest level of review is the rational 
basis test—a highly deferential form of scrutiny. In order for a regulation to survive rational basis review, 
the challenger must prove that the regulation does not bear a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate 
governmental purpose.’”). 
60.   See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that 


















in many laws, particularly those affecting economic and social welfare, that 
time is better spent on tasks other than untangling them.  
Beyond this first-level categorical concern, Breyer contended in 2019 
that the “Court’s speech-related categories,” such as “content 
discrimination” and “viewpoint discrimination,” should serve only “as rules 
of thumb,” rather than as “outcome-determinative rules,” when resolving 
First Amendment cases.61 He elaborated that “[r]ather than deducing the 
answers to First Amendment questions strictly from categories, as the Court 
often does, I would appeal more often and more directly to the values the 
First Amendment seeks to protect.”62 He sounded the same sentiment in 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert,63 contending that: 
[t]he First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity 
both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the 
public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple 
recitation of categories, such as “content discrimination” 
and “strict scrutiny,” would permit.  In my view, the 
category “content discrimination” is better considered in 
many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather 
than as an automatic “strict scrutiny” trigger, leading to 
almost certain legal condemnation.64 
As these quotations reveal, Breyer’s approach to scrutiny is not dictated 
by categories.  Categories simply are rules of thumb—they are “helpful, but 
not determinative legal tool[s]” that serve “as a supplement” to another 
analysis.65  That other analysis hinges on the extent to which a law threatens 
First Amendment values and objectives. Focusing on First Amendment 
values is essential for Breyer because they are, in his view, “the 
constitutional analogue of statutory purposes.”66 
In particular, Breyer’s approach to scrutiny asks whether a law “work[s] 
harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate to their 
 
61.   Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring part, dissenting in 
part).  
62.   Id. at 2305 (emphasis added). 
63.   576 U.S. 155 (2015); see supra notes 43–48 accompanying text (addressing Reed). 
64.   Reed, 576 U.S. at 175–76 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
65.   Id. at 179. 
66.   STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 162 (2010). 

















furtherance of legitimate regulatory objectives.”67 This “proportionality 
question” is the heart of his methodology for determining if a law passes 
First Amendment muster. 68  In brief, the “seriousness of the harm to speech” 
must be weighed against “the importance of the countervailing objectives” 
in regulating it.69 This, Breyer acknowledges, is a balancing tack.70 
What is key here is that laws receive closer, more exacting scrutiny 
when they threaten “the speech interests that the First Amendment 
protects”71 and more deferential, relaxed review when they do not.  As 
Breyer explains, when “‘core’ political speech” is threatened, then “the First 
Amendment imposes tight constraints” on lawmakers.72  That is because, in 
his view, “the processes through which political discourse or public opinion 
is formed or expressed” are “interests close to the First Amendment’s 
protective core.”73 Breyer notes that other “widely accepted First 
Amendment goals” meriting heightened scrutiny when they are truly 
threatened include protecting unpopular ideas and viewpoints from 
censorship and facilitating truth-seeking in the marketplace of ideas.74 
Indeed, for Breyer, the value of protecting a robust marketplace of ideas is 
linked to the promotion of democratic self-governance.75 
Conversely, laws that only minimally effect such core First Amendment 
interests—laws regulating ordinary business transactions, for instance—are 
 
67.   Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also 
Reed, 576 U.S. at 179 (Breyer, J. concurring) (describing the “basic analysis” as “ask[ing] whether the 
regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the 
relevant regulatory objectives”). 
68.   Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2306 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
69.   Reed, 576 U.S. at 179 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
70.   See BREYER, supra note 66, at 164 (“Judges who use proportionality ask whether the 
restriction on speech is proportionate to, or properly balances, the need.”) (emphasis added). 
71.   Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2304-06 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
72.   Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 582 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
73.   Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).   
74.   Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382–83 (2018) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  See also Reed, 576 U.S. at 176 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that strict scrutiny 
applies when law regulates content in order to suppress a viewpoint). 
75.   See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 583 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stressing “the constitutional 
importance of maintaining a free marketplace of ideas . . . that provides access to ‘social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences,’’ and adding that “[w]ithout such a marketplace, the 
public could not freely choose a government pledged to implement policies that reflect the people’s 


















subject to much more deferential review akin to rational basis.76  Measures 
limiting the flow of truthful information about commercial goods face a 
level of review somewhere in between those affecting political speech and 
laws implementing economic and social policies.77 
How might facets of this methodology improve the Court’s current 
approach to scrutiny when laws are challenged on First Amendment free-
speech grounds?  The Article next proposes a two-level analysis that melds 
aspects of the current categorical approach with Justice Breyer’s appeal to 
First Amendment values. 
 
 
III. TOWARD A TWO-STEP APPROACH TO SCRUTINY: BLENDING 
CATEGORIES AND VALUES  
 
This Article explained the friction on today’s Supreme Court over First 
Amendment scrutiny standards, especially when it comes to using 
heightened scrutiny to evaluate laws regulating economic and social 
activities.78  It also addressed the worry that applying the sledgehammer test 
that is strict scrutiny to measure the validity of laws regulating low-value 
expression amounts to judicial overkill of legislative handiwork.79  The root 
problem in both scenarios is that categorizing a law as content based 
presumptively triggers strict scrutiny, especially after Reed held that a 
benign justification cannot transform a facially content based law into a 
content neutral one.80  
Rather than deploying strict scrutiny solely because a law is categorized 
as content based, greater energy, in Justice Breyer’s view, should be 
expended on analyzing whether a law threatens core values that the First 
Amendment safeguards, including protecting political speech and 
unpopular viewpoints, as well as facilitating a robust marketplace of ideas 
to promote truth discovery.81  Categories, in Breyer’s view, remain useful, 
but only as rules of thumb that play a flexible—not definitive—role in 
 
76.   Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).   
77.   Id.  
78.   Supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text. 
79.   Supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
80.   See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text (addressing Reed). 
81.   Supra notes 62–75 and accompanying text. 

















discerning the scrupulousness of scrutiny.82  
This Article advocates for a sequential, two-step or two-prong approach 
to scrutiny determinations.  The first step is categorical.  It embraces the 
current approach for selecting scrutiny, but in a nonbinding fashion. 
Specifically, it requires courts to decide if a statute is content neutral, 
content based or viewpoint based, with such categorization creating a 
rebuttable presumption that a particular level of scrutiny applies 
(intermediate for content neutral laws, strict scrutiny for content based and 
viewpoint based ones).83 
The second step then is values oriented.  It mandates that courts evaluate 
whether the initial scrutiny presumption should be rebutted.  In particular, 
it obliges them, in Breyer-based fashion, to analyze whether the statute at 
issue threatens a core First Amendment value (or values) and, if so, the 
gravity of the threat to that value.  Those key values include, but are not 
limited to, ones Breyer has, to one degree or another, already recognized:84 
(1) protecting political speech and political discourse that might, as 
philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn put it, facilitate “the voting of 
wise decisions;”85 (2) safeguarding the processes of truth-seeking and truth-
testing in the metaphorical public marketplace of ideas; and (3) shielding 
ideas, viewpoints and information from censorship simply because they are 
unpopular. Courts are free here to consider if other First Amendment values, 
such as individual self-realization and self-fulfillment through the receipt of 
speech and engagement in it, are jeopardized.86 
Depending on whether or not a court determines that any such values 
are threatened by a statute and, in turn, how serious or grave the threat is to 
those values, it is then free to rebut the initial scrutiny presumption and work 
its way up or down the three typical tiers of scrutiny in constitutional law—
 
82.   See supra note 65 and accompanying text (setting forth Breyer’s articulation of a rule of 
thumb). 
83.   See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (summarizing this aspect of the categorical 
approach). 
84.   See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (addressing First Amendment values and 
interests that Breyer has recognized). 
85.   ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 
(1948). 
86.   See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (asserting 
that “freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment. The proper 



















strict, intermediate and rational basis.  A jump downward by more than one 
tier of scrutiny—in other words, moving down from strict scrutiny to 
rational basis review—would require a greater level of proof by a court that 
no First Amendment interests are jeopardized in any serious fashion than 
would a move downward by only one tier of scrutiny from either strict to 
intermediate or from intermediate to rational basis review. 
This approach, in turn, would also encourage attorneys in First 
Amendment speech cases to elaborate in their briefs and during oral 
argument on whether or not First Amendment values are endangered by a 
statute.  Attorneys, in other words, would have the opportunity to argue to 
courts something along the lines of—colloquially speaking—“I know this 
law is content based and thus presumptively should face strict scrutiny 
under Reed, but here’s why you should not follow that presumption and, 
instead, why you should apply a lower standard of review.  In short, no First 
Amendment values are possibly harmed in any serious fashion by the 
statute.”  Or, in another scenario, they might contend, “We understand this 
law is content neutral and thus presumptively is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, but the law nonetheless seriously imperils multiple core First 
Amendment values and thus we respectfully request that you ratchet upward 
the level of review to strict scrutiny.”  
This obviously is a rough, working framework for First Amendment 
scrutiny going forward. The nuances must be worked out over time by 
courts, but the values-based second prong is deliberately flexible in order to 
afford courts latitude in their analysis rather than being boxed in, as they 
now are, by a purely categorical methodology. The constricted and 
restricted nature of the categorical approach, after all, is a primary complaint 
of Justice Breyer, whose values-centric tack animates this second step of 
this proposal.  The bottom line is that a blend of nonbinding categories, 
supplemented by serious consideration and analysis of First Amendment 
values, may offer the Court the best of both the categorical and balancing 
worlds.
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